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Barnum, Cre´peau, Gottesman, Tapp, and Smith [1] proposed methods for authentication of quantum
messages. The first method is an interactive protocol (TQA’) based on teleportation. The second method
is a noninteractive protocol (QA) in which the sender first encrypts the message using a protocol QEnc
and then encodes the quantum ciphertext with an error correcting code chosen secretly from a set (a
purity test code (PTC)). Encryption was shown to be necessary for authentication.
We augment the protocol QA with an extra step which recycles the entire encryption key provided QA
accepts the message. We analyze the resulting integrated protocol for quantum authentication and key
generation, which we call QA+KG. Our main result is a proof that QA+KG is universal composably
(UC) secure in the Ben-Or–Mayers model [2]. More specifically, this implies the UC-security of (a)
QA, (b) recycling of the encryption key in QA, and (c) key-recycling of the encryption scheme QEnc
by appending PTC. For an m-qubit message, encryption requires 2m bits of key; but PTC can be
performed using only O(logm) + O(log ǫ) bits of key for probability of failure ǫ. Thus, we reduce the
key required for both QA and QEnc, from linear to logarithmic net consumption, at the expense of one
bit of back communication which can happen any time after the conclusion of QA and before reusing
the key. UC-security of QA also extends security to settings not obvious from [1].
Our security proof structure is inspired by and similar to that of [1], reducing the security of QA to
that of TQA’. In the process, we define UC-secure entanglement, and prove the UC-security of the
entanglement generating protocol given in [1], which could be of independent interest.
1 Context, results and related work
Encryption and authentication of quantum messages
Barnum, Cre´peau, Gottesman, Tapp, and Smith [1] studied authentication of quantum messages.
Their first proposed method is an interactive protocol (TQA’) based on teleportation. Entanglement
is first established between the sender, Alice, and the receiver, Bob, via an insecure quantum
channel, using a method called the purity test protocol (PTP). If that is successful, the quantum
message is teleported. A two-way authenticated classical channel is assumed. Their second proposed
method is a noninteractive protocol (QA) in which the sender first encrypts the message (using
a protocol called QEnc [3,4] and 2m bits of key for an m-qubit message) and then encodes the
quantum ciphertext with an error correcting code chosen secretly from a set. QA rejects/accepts
if an error is/not detected. The set of possible error correcting codes is called the purity test code
(PTC). Each code uses s = s′+1/2− log(m/s) extra qubits of communication, and takes 2s′+2+
2 log(m/s′) key-bits to choose secretly, in order to achieve a probability of failure (as defined below)
of ǫ ≤ 2−s′ . Unlike authentication of classical messages, which can be done without encryption and
with key size O(log(m)), [1] proved the necessity of encryption in quantum authentication. Thus,
in the noninteractive setting, the key length must be at least 2m required for encryption [3].
Key recycling – intuition and early ideas
The protocol QA is somewhat analogous to the classical scheme due to Wegman and Carter [5].
The latter requires a large key but most of it can be reused so that only a logarithmic sized key
is actually consumed. A natural question is whether it is possible to reuse part of the key required
in QA. For quantum messages, successful eavesdropping necessarily causes disturbance [6]. This
insight [7,8], which even then suggested the possibility of key recycling, led to the original discovery
of quantum key distribution (QKD) [9]. In [10], encryption using a quantum key with recycling was
proven secure, and the question arose whether the classical key in QEnc could likewise be securely
recycled. Using two-way classical discussion to implement a form of quantum authentication before
it was formalized in [1], some security statements were obtained. Qualitatively, it is unlikely for
a quantum message to be authenticated and accepted if it has been attacked and the key been
compromised. This opens the tantalizing possibility of reusing the key whenever the message is
accepted. However, a proper security statement for key recycling can be hard to formulate, let
alone be obtained, because it requires an analysis of the most general joint quantum attack on
quantum authentication together with the scheme that subsequently uses the recycled key. To
complicate matters further, the usual security measure for a key in terms of Eve’s classical mutual
information was found to be highly unstable with respect to additional classical information on the
key (see [11], the motivation for [12] and [13]).
The universal composability approach
To resolve these questions in a robust way, we analyze the security of QA and key recycling in
the framework of universal composability. This also proves that QA has some additional nontrivial
security features.
Composability is concerned with the security of composing cryptographic primitives in a possibly
complex manner. The simplest example is the security of using a cryptographic primitive as a
subroutine in another application. We will follow the universal composability (UC) approach: For
a specific task (functionality), a primitive that realizes the task is defined to be universally com-
posable if it cannot be distinguished (up to a bias which is the security parameter) from the ideal
functionality (augmented with a simulator) by any “environment” that controls the input, retains
a purification, provides it to the adversary, directs the adversarial attacks, and receives the state
possessed by the adversary as well as all user outputs of the protocol. Any application using the
primitive (as a subroutine) is provably essentially as secure as one using the ideal functionality.
Also, a recursive argument for security holds for a composite protocol with acyclic modular struc-
ture, and the resulting security parameter is at most additive. A security definition that ensures
universal composability was recently proposed by Canetti [14] in the classical setting. A simpler
model in the quantum setting and a corresponding universal composable security definition were
reported in [15,2]. (An alternative approach to composability was obtained in [16] in the classical
setting, and generalized to the quantum setting in [17,18].)
Since we are concerned with unconditional security, the analysis is particularly simple – it suffices
to show that the actual primitive and the ideal functionality (augmented with a simulator) cannot
be distinguished by any physical process. Universal composability provides a systematic, general
and robust framework for analyzing the security of recycled key, even in the presence of subtleties
including entanglement and collective attacks.
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Our techniques, proof structure, and results
In [1], security for quantum authentication is defined in terms of the probability of failing to reject
in the presence of a detectable error. The authors consider a protocol TQA which is similar to
TQA’ except Bob never tells Alice whether the entanglement is accepted or rejected. In TQA, the
purity test code (PTC) is only used in a subroutine to establish entanglement (ebits) between Alice
and Bob. The authors proved the security of TQA and the equivalence of the security of QA and
TQA.
To analyze the security of key recycling in the UC framework, we consider an augmented protocol,
QA+KG, which recycles the 2m key-bits used in the QEnc step if QA accepts. Note that key
recycling requires Alice to know whether QA accepts or rejects. We model our ideal functionality
for key generation for the non-interactive protocol QA+KG, such that if Alice further receives one
bit of back communication from Bob, she can complete the ideal key recycling step. With this in
mind:
(1) We show QA+KG and TQA+KG are indistinguishable to any environment. Thus the two
protocols QA and TQA still have equivalent securities even with key recycling and in the UC
framework.
We also formalize how TQA uses a subroutine “EBIT[PTC]” which generates entanglement via
insecure channel using PTC as a subroutine. TQA+KG teleports [19] the quantum message using
EBIT[PTC] and a perfect encrypted and authenticated classical channel denoted by CI. After using
the classical message to complete teleportation, it is output as a key. In other words, the protocol
TQA+KG can be interpreted as (TP+KG)[EBIT[PTC],CI] where TP stands for teleportation.
(2) Following [1], and applying results from there, we show that EBIT[PTC] cannot be distinguished
from a different protocol EBIT[PTP] for generating entanglement.
(3) We show that EBIT[PTP] and the ideal functionality EBITI for generating entanglement cannot
be distinguished by any environment with bias better than 2
√
2ǫ1/3 where ǫ is the probability of
failure in PTP. This proves that EBIT[PTP] is a UC secure method to generate entanglement.
Technically, this is the only step in our proof that involves the construction of a “simulator” which
is crucial in directly establishing the UC security of a protocol. (The rest of our proof relies on
transitivity and the composability theorem.)
(4) We apply (2)-(3) and the composability theorem to show that TP[EBIT[PTC],CI] and the ideal
channel QI=TP[EBITI,CI] cannot be distinguished with bias great than 2
√
2ǫ1/3.
(5) Finally, we show that (TP+KG)[EBIT[PTC],CI] and QI+KDI (where KDI denotes an ideal
key generating functionality) cannot be distinguished by any environment with bias greater than
2
√
2ǫ1/3. The intuition is that, replacing EBIT[PTC] by EBITI in (TP+KG)[EBIT[PTC],CI] also
protects the classical teleportation message which then can be reused as a key.
Together, QA+KG is distinguishable from QI+KDI with bias at most 2
√
2ǫ1/3.
We thus prove that QA+KG is UC secure in the Ben-Or-Mayers model [2]. More specifically, this
implies the UC-security of (a) QA, (b) recycling of the encryption key in QA, and (c) key-recycling
of QEnc by appending PTC. We reduce the key required for both QA and QEnc, from linear in
the message size to a logarithmic net consumption (if QA accepts), at the expense of one bit of
back communication which can happen any time after the conclusion of QA and before using the
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recycled key. Furthermore, UC-security of QA implies it can be used securely in other cryptographic
tasks. In particular, parallel composition is secure against joint attacks, and QA is still secure if
the adversary possesses the purifying system of the message to be authenticated. These are not
immediate consequences of the analysis in [1].
In the process, we define UC security for entanglement generation and prove the UC-security for
the protocol EBIT[PTC] proposed in [1], which is of independent interest.
Our result does not contradict earlier lower bounds on the key size, which applies to noninteractive
protocols and is concerned with the initial key needed. Another nice aspect of our results is that one
can simply reuse the encryption key without further privacy amplification, in contrast to quantum
key distribution and earlier proposals for key recycling.
Prior and related work
We have discussed background results leading to this investigation (which started 2003) – the
QEnc and QA protocols in [3,1], UC security [2] and some early investigations of key recycling
[10]. Our proof steps are similar to those in [1], but we resolve definitional ambiguities in [1] and
with the composability framework obtain more precise and stronger security results (UC security
of QA, QEnc (by adding PTC), EBIT[PTC], EBIT[PTP], and key recycling). Throughout, we may
emphasize the modular structure of a protocol P calling a subroutine σ by writing P[σ].
We now discuss other related works since this project started.
The security of key recycling in QA was studied independently by M. Horodecki and Oppenheim [20]
in 2003. However [20] does not address the security of QA, and it assumes an adversary who does
not possess the purification. For that reason, we believe their claim to UC security, even if it holds,
requires a nontrivial proof, but none was given.
In 2005, Damgard, Pedersen, and Salvail [21] proposed key recycling for the encryption of classical
messages by using the Wegman-Carter classical authentication scheme followed by a quantum
encryption scheme based on key uncertainty or locking [11]. Encryption of quantum messages was
said to be possible in the introduction but no proof of this assertion was given in the text. Regardless,
the results in [21] are quite different from ours because encryption and authentication of classical
messages are much weaker tasks cryptographically. Also, locking is highly non-composable when a
quantum adversary has quantum memory and delays measurements. It is unclear how the analysis
in [21] fits into the composability framework, despite a claim (without formal definition or proof)
of the composable security of the regenerated key. (We detail the differences here since an earlier
version of our paper was rejected in 2007 by a referee who assumed this work to be similar to [21].)
In this paper, we emphasize the necessity of considering the composable security of the regenerated
key, since the entire purpose of recycling the key is to use it later. Furthermore, universal compos-
ability is precisely what allows the key to be used in a yet-to-be-specified and unrestricted manner.
Without such an assurance, the security of key recycling is ill-defined.
This paper has had an unusually long gestation. We presented a preliminary version of our results
at QIP 2004 and a draft has informally circulated since 2008. An updated version appeared in
QCRYPT 2011. (The full submission was provided to the authors of related works [22,23,24] prior
to their appearing in the arXiv.)
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Until this year, ours remained the only proof of the composable security of QA and of key recycling
in QA and QEnc. A flurry of recent activity in the area by other authors prompted us to produce
and submit this final version of our draft.
First, Garg, Yuen, and Zhandry [23] gave a new definition of quantum authentication called “total
authentication” that they showed to permit composably secure key recycling. They further exhibited
several new protocols satisfying the definition. Our work implied that QA proposed in [1] satisfies
total authentication but with a very small key leakage.
More recently, Portmann [24] has established proofs of both of our main results in the framework of
abstract cryptography [25]. Furthermore, partial key recycling is proven secure when authentication
fails. His work formally considers impersonation attack, whereas all other work implicitly assumes
this is a special case of the substitution attack. His work also explicitly considers communication
over noisy channels. We have added a short discussion to our paper that illustrates how secure
authentication (with key recycling) over noisy channels is an immediate corollary of composable
security of QA+KG.
One feature that slightly distinguishes [23,24] from ours is that they demonstrate that the entire key
can be recycled whereas we sacrifice a vanishing fraction of the key. While interesting theoretically,
the distinction is not practically important because, in our case, additional key to make up for
the small loss can be added to the message with negligible additional cost. Furthermore, some
of the schemes that allow total key recycling require substantially more initial key (while QA is
key-optimal up to an additive logarithmic amount, which we believe can be reduced to a constant
in view of results in [26]).
In another recent contribution, somewhat closing the circle, Fehr and Salvail [27] proved that secret
key could be securely recycled in a quantum protocol for authenticating classical messages. Their
protocol is a slightly modified version of one first proposed by Bennett, Brassard, and Breidbart in
1982 [7] and within reach using current experimental techniques.
The current manuscript differs from our QCRYPT’11 submission in four ways. (1) We found a
mis-statement of the adversarial power in the QCRYPT’11 submission which is corrected here –
the adversary should be given the purification of the message (full quantum side information) for
the attack. Our proof is independent of whether the adversary is given this purification or not. (2)
We simplified the last step of the proof (and as a bonus reduced the insecurity parameter by a
factor of 3). (3) In view of [22], we removed claims of proof of the composability of the Wegman-
Carter authentication scheme for classical messages in this paper. Our claim was based on a simple
(but slightly mistaken) proof in a half-page appendix. We decide to keep the appendix for readers
who want a quick main idea, but refer to the detailed subsequent result in [22]. (4) We revived
an appendix on authentication of pure quantum states (which was removed in QCRYPT’11 due
to page limit). Finally, as mentioned earlier, we briefly discussed the case for transmission through
noisy channel, and made other minor changes.
Comparison with other methods
There are two other quantummethods that provide similar security for quantummessage encryption
and authentication using only a small key. We now compare other costs, such as the amount
of (forward) quantum communication, forward and backward classical communication, and the
round/interaction complexity.
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If the original message has m qubits, QA+KG consumes a little more than m qubits of communi-
cation, one bit of back communication (which can be delayed until right before reusing the key),
and a little more than 2m key-bits; 2m of them can be regenerated if authentication accepts.
A first alternative to this approach is to use QKD to securely expand the classical key before
running QA without key recycling. This requires only a small initial key (not just the amortized
one). The drawback is that the QKD protocol itself needs at least 2m qubits, two rounds of classical
back communication, and a linear amount of forward classical communication. The first round of
back communication is to acknowledge the receipt of the quantum states by Bob, followed by 1- or
2-way public discussion (that itself has to be authenticated) and finally more back communication
to finalize the output key size. Then, m more qubits have to be sent in QA. Thus, this method
consumes substantially more quantum communication and forward classical communication, and
one extra round of back communication. Furthermore, the back communication has to be performed
during the protocol. Running QA before QKD requires the long 2m-bit initial key, but the back
communication can be delayed until the QKD is run (but before the application using the key
produced).
A second alternative is TQA – teleport the quantum message using ebits obtained by potentially
insecure means in addition to an insecure forward classical channel that needs classical message
authentication. (Since we prove the composable security of EBIT[PTC] and the Wegman-Carter
scheme is composably secure [22], this method is composably secure.) Classical message authentica-
tion requires a long key, but most of it can be reused securely regardless of the authentication result.
EBIT[PTC] uses a small key and back communication, and generates a quantum key. (Thus, back
communication is needed during the protocol itself, unlike for QA+KG.) Compared to QA+KG,
this scheme uses a similar amount of quantum communication, more initial key and forward clas-
sical communication, in addition to a similar amount of classical back communication. But TQA
offers two advantages over QA+KG. First, failing PTC when generating ebits does not destroy
the quantum message itself (so the message is not only authenticated, but protected). Second, the
classical authentication key is always recycled.
We emphasize that these methods and QA+KG are incomparable and interesting for different
reasons. Also, we are concerned not only with the key requirement, but security definitions and
composability of protocols like QA and EBIT[PTC].
Organization of the paper
We will discuss background materials concerning the security setting, quantum mechanics, quantum
encryption, quantum authentication, and quantum universal composability in Sect. 2, and prove
the security of QA+KG in Sect. 3. Other results and open questions will be discussed in Sect. 4. A
glossary, the quantum UC model, the extended transpose trick, a simple (but slightly mistaken)
proof of the quantum UC-security of the Wegman-Carter scheme, and the security of authentication
for pure quantum states with half of the initial key cost are given in the appendices.
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2 Setting, notation, definitions, and background
Setting. The sender, the receiver, and the adversary are called Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively.
We consider unconditional security, i.e., security against an Eve whose capabilities are only limited
by quantum mechanics.
Basic elements of quantum mechanics. A quantum system with d distinguishable states is
associated with the d-dimensional complex Hilbert space Cd. The set of linear and unitary operators
acting on Cd are denoted by B(Cd) and U(Cd) respectively. Composite systems are associated with
tensor product Hilbert spaces.
The state of a quantum system is represented by a positive semidefinite density matrix ρ ∈ B(Cd)
of unit trace. It is a convex combination (or probabilistic mixture) of rank-1 projectors (commonly
called pure states). Pure states can be represented as unit vectors |ψ〉 ∈ Cd, up to a physically
unobservable phase, and we write the corresponding density matrix |ψ〉〈ψ| simply as ψ. Throughout,
we denote an ebit by |Φ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+|11〉) and its density matrix by Φ.
A measurement M is specified by a POVM — a set of positive semidefinite operators {Ok} such
that
∑
kOk = I. If the state is initially ρ, the measurementM yields the outcome k with probability
Tr(Okρ) and changes the state to
√
Okρ
√
Ok/Tr(Okρ), without loss of generality. M is said to be
along a basis {|k〉} if {Ok} = {|k〉〈k|}. Measuring an unknown state generally disturbs it.
The most general evolution of a state is given by a trace-preserving completely-positive (TCP)
linear map E acting on B(C). (See [28] for various representations.) Discarding a (sub)system is
given by the (partial) trace operation. Every state ρ ∈ B(Cd) can be written as the partial trace of
some pure state |ψ〉 ∈ Cd⊗Cd′ . In other words, ρ = Tr2(ψ) and |ψ〉 is called its purification, and
the extra system is called the purifying system.
Subscripts of states and operations often (though not always) label the system being acted on.
We mention two distance measures for quantum states. The first measure is the trace distance
1
2‖ρ1−ρ2‖1 between two density matrices ρ1 and ρ2, where ‖ · ‖1 denotes the Schatten 1-norm. The
maximum probability of distinguishing the two states drawn randomly is given by 12 +
1
4‖ρ1− ρ2‖1.
The second measure is the fidelity, F (ρ1, ρ2) = max|ψ1〉,|ψ2〉 |〈ψ1|ψ2〉|2, where ρ1,2 ∈ B(C), |ψ1,2〉 ∈
C ⊗ C′ are purifications of ρ1,2 and 〈·|·〉 is the inner product in C ⊗ C′. Note that we have an
additional square in the fidelity compared to other references such as [28].
We denote by σ10=
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σ01=
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, and σ11=σ10σ01 the Pauli matrices acting on 1 qubit.
The Pauli group acting on m qubits is generated multiplicatively by σ10, σ01 acting on each qubit.
The interested reader can consult [28] for a more comprehensive review.
2.1 Quantum encryption
Definition
The cryptographic task of quantum encryption can be described as follows. Alice and Bob share a
key K in which the realization k occurs with probability pk. To send a message ρ, Alice transmits
Ek(ρ) and Bob applies Dk to retrieve ρ. A quantum encryption scheme should satisfy two properties:
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Completeness: ∀k Dk Ek = I, the identity operation.
Soundness: R(ρ) :=∑k pk Ek(ρ) = ρ0, where ρ0 is a constant.
The soundness condition is an exact security statement that, without knowledge of the key, a
specimen of the encrypted message R(ρ) is independent of the actual message ρ. If the message
systemM is entangled with other systems, let R be its purifying system, and |ψ〉MR the purification.
By linearity (RM ⊗ IR)(ψ) = ρ0 ⊗ TrM (ψ) which means that the transmission is still completely
useless to the strongest eavesdropping adversary who already possesses all the correlations with M
contained in R. A natural approximate security condition is, ∀|ψ〉MR, ‖(R⊗I)(ψ)−ρ0⊗TrM (ψ)‖1 <
ǫ, a small security parameter. Note ‖R(ρ)− ρ0‖1 < ǫ is generally too weak for a security definition
[29], unless the adversary is restricted to not having the purifying system R. A scheme that satisfies
this last condition will be called an approximate encryption scheme (with security parameter ǫ).
Known constructions
A special case is Ek(ρ) = UkρU †k with each Uk unitary. In particular, exact encryption can be
achieved by taking K to be a random 2m-bit string, and for k = (x1, z1, · · · , xm, zm), Uk = σx1z1 ⊗
· · · σxmzm =: σxz. We call this specific protocol QEnc. There are approximate encryption schemes
with certain Uk and K of size m+O(logm)+2 log(1/ǫ) bits [29,30,31] (improved to m+2 log(1/ǫ)+8
bits in [32]). We focus on the scheme in [29,32] and call it ≈QEnc.
Relation of QEnc to teleportation and remote state preparation, and lower bounds
In teleportation (TP) [19] of 1 qubit, Alice and Bob share one ebit in systems A and B. The message
ρ in systemM is transmitted by Alice measuringMA in the Bell basis {I⊗σxz|Φ〉}x,z. Conditioned
on the outcome x, z, the state in system B is σxz ρ σxz. Thus, if Bob knows x, z (sent to him from
Alice by a classical channel), he can recover the message ρ. An m-qubit message can be teleported
qubit-wise.
Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the protocols for QEnc and TP; the key in
QEnc translates to the measurement outcome, and thus the communicated message, in TP. A sim-
ilar correspondence holds between any quantum encryption scheme and a generalized teleportation
protocol that sends quantum states using classical communication and entanglement [3,33]. Com-
posing generalized teleportation with superdense coding [34] to transmit 2m classical bits proves
that 2m bits is a lower bound on the communication cost of generalized teleportation and thus a
lower bound on the key cost in any exact encryption as well.
Likewise, there is a one-to-one correspondence between approximate quantum encryption protocols
and a class of schemes [35,29] for remote state preparation (RSP) [36]. In these schemes, Alice has
a classical description of the message, applies a measurement to her half of the ebits, and sends the
outcome to Bob. In particular, the POVM can be chosen to contain the operators { 1M (UkρU †k)T }k
for M = ‖∑k UkρU †k‖∞, and conditioned on receiving the outcome k, Bob’s half of the ebits
becomes UkρU
†
k . (See also Appendix C.) When k takes 2
m+2 log(1/ǫ)+8 values, RSP succeeds with
probability at least 1 − ǫ [29,32], while using only about half of the communication required by
teleportation. Furthermore, this communication cost is optimal [35,29]. As a result, approximate
encryption requires about half of the key needed for exact quantum encryption. One can interpret
this result as follows. Exact quantum encryption breaks all possible correlations with a purifying
system, while approximate encryption does not. The decorrelation in exact quantum encryption
requires the extra key.
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2.2 Quantum authentication
Definition
Alice and Bob share a key K with distribution {pk}k, and the realization is k. Alice applies an
encoding map Ek that takes the m-qubit message system M to an (m+l)-qubit system T , which is
transmitted to Bob. After Bob receives the possibly altered system T , he applies a decoding map
Dk which outputs an m-qubit message in M and one extra qubit V with two states labelled by
|acc〉, |rej〉. The security conditions apply to any purification |ψ〉RM (with reference system R) of
the message state in system M .
Completeness: ∀k: (IR ⊗ (Dk Ek)M )(ψRM ) = ψRM ⊗ acc
Soundness: Let the adversarial attack be a TCP map given by O. Then the output of the protocol
is ρ˜RMV =
∑
k pk(IR ⊗ (DkOEk)M )(ψRM ). The scheme is said to have security parameter ǫ if
Tr
[
(I − ψ)RM ⊗ accV
]
ρ˜RMV < ǫ.
Intuitively, the above conditions say that quantum authentication should accept and transmit a
message perfectly in the absence of tampering, and reject with high probability otherwise.
Unlike quantum encryption, it is intrinsically impossible to achieve perfect soundness. The issue
of approximate security involving purifications is subtle but it was not explicitly dealt with in [1].
(See endnote [37].) The above conditions take into account purifications which captures all possible
correlations between the message M and other systems (though not obviously composable).
Known constructions
We first describe the quantum authentication scheme QA constructed in [1] in detail in the following.
It has two main subroutines, the quantum encryption scheme QEnc described in the previous
subsection, and quantum purity test codes (PTC), which are closely related to quantum purity test
protocols (PTP).
Consider a set of quantum stabilizer codes {Qt} [38,39] encoding m qubits into n qubits. The set
{Qt} is said to be a stabilizer purity test code with error ǫ if, for any nontrivial n-qubit Pauli error
E, at least a fraction 1− ǫ of the codes detect it.
A purity test protocol with error ǫ is a superoperator T which can be implemented with local
operations and classical communication (LOCC), and which maps 2n qubits, half held by Alice
and half by Bob, to 2m+ 1 qubits satisfying the following two conditions (here n = m+ l, l ≥ 0):
Completeness: T (Φ⊗n) = Φ⊗m ⊗ acc .
Soundness: ∀ρ Tr [T (ρ) [ (I − Φ⊗m)⊗acc ] ] < ǫ.
Each purity test code {Qt} gives rise to a purity test protocol T as follows [1]. Each of Alice and
Bob measures the syndrome of Qt on his/her n qubits, for the same random t. If their syndromes
agree, they accept and then perform the decoding procedure for Qt; otherwise they reject. If the
purity test code {Qt} has error ǫ, then T is a purity test protocol with error ǫ. An efficient purity
test code was constructed in [1], such that l = s and ǫ = 2 1+m/s1+2s for message length m and any
chosen s. The shared random variable t should be independent of the 2n-qubit input of the purity
test protocol. Throughout this paper, t is a secret key inaccessible to the adversary to ensure the
independence condition. In the LOCC setting it can be generated by one party and communicated
to the other party.
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The noninteractive protocol QA with security parameter ǫ consists of first applying QEnc to the
m-qubit message, followed by using additional secret key to further encode with a purity test code
and then apply an operation corresponding to a random syndrome (all parameters as described
above). Formally, QA=QA[QEnc,PTC,KDI]. It requires m+ s qubits of quantum communication
and 2m+ s+ log2(2
s + 1) key-bits. Both costs are asymptotically optimal as quantum encryption
is necessary for quantum encryption [1]. The security of QA is reduced to that of an interactive
protocol TQA’ in which a purity test protocol is first used to establish a (2m+1)-qubit state, the
first 2m qubits are used to teleport the message, and the last is in the acc or rej state. QA satisfies
the completeness and soundness security conditions stated above. (See endnote [37].)
See Sect. 1 (under “related works”) for some additional very recent constructions [23].
2.3 Quantum Universal Composability Theorem
Throughout the paper, we denote the associated ideal functionality of a protocol by adding a
subscript I. Different protocols can have the same ideal functionality. A protocol P calling a sub-
protocol σ is denoted as P[σ]. Two conjoining protocols (implemented by a joint circuit) are written
as P1+P2. Two protocols P1,P2 implemented with the same circuit are said to be equal P1 = P2;
the circuit can be interpreted in two ways.
In the universal composability (UC) approach [14,15,2]:
(1) A UC security definition for a primitive is one that can be stated for a single execution of
the primitive but nonetheless guarantees security of composition with any other properly defined
system. This definition involves a description of some ideal functionality of the primitive. The goal
is to preserve security in a basic composition. More concretely, we want a security definition such
that, if σ is a secure realization of an ideal subroutine σI, and a protocol P using σI, written as
P[σI], is a secure realization of PI (the ideal functionality of P), then P[σ] is also a secure realization
of PI.
(2) A prescription for how to securely perform basic composition recursively allows any complex
protocol to be built out of secure components.
A simplified model appropriate to our setting is described in Appendix B. (See also [12].) In essence,
the UC security condition for P expresses that P and PI are indistinguishable by any adversarial
attack. It does so by defining an “environment” E that includes the actual adversary and any
application protocol that calls P. The environment controls the protocol’s input and receives its
output, and ultimately itself outputing a binary random variable Γ . For this E , extend PI by a
simulator S to an extended ideal protocol and denote the conjoining protocols as PI+S. E still
controls the input/output of the unit (out of the control of S) but insecure channels and other
insecurities of P are “simulated” by S. (See Fig. 1 in Appendix B.) The random variable ΓI output
in this case generally differs from Γ , and their statistical difference quantifies the security – the
smaller the statistical difference the higher the security. This motivates the following definition of
universal composable security:
Definition 1: P is said to ǫ-securely realize PI (shorthand P ǫ-s.r. PI) if
∀E ∃S s.t. ‖Γ − ΓI ‖1 ≤ ǫ . (1)
We call ǫ in (1) the distinguishability-advantage between P and PI. It has a simple operational
meaning. The entire interaction between the environment E (including the adversary) and the
protocol P can be described by a circuit of gates and channels, as can the interaction between E
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and PI+S. For a given environment, each interaction results in a corresponding final state. The
environment makes the best quantum measurement to distinguish which one of the two final states
it has, and the output distributions for the two interactions are Γ and ΓI respectively. Due to a
result by Helstrom (see [40,41]) the maximum value of ‖Γ − ΓI ‖1 is simply the trace distance
between the two possible final states (before the measurement). Thus ǫ is an upper bound to the
trace distance between the possible final states, maximized by the environment and minimized by
the simulator.
This security definition (in the model described) is useful because security of basic composition
follows “by definition” [15,2].
Theorem 1. Suppose a protocol P calls a subroutine σ. If σ ǫσ-s.r. σI and P[σI] ǫP-s.r. PI, then
P[σ] ǫ-s.r. PI for ǫ ≤ ǫP+ǫσ.
Theorem 1 can be generalized to any arbitrary protocol with a proper modular structure, as defined
in Appendix B. An example of an improper modular structure is one with a security deadlock,
but the protocols we analyze in this paper all generate proper modular structures. The idea is to
represent the protocol as a tree and then apply Theorem 1 recursively to the leaves of the tree.
Roughly speaking, to build the tree, represent any arbitrary protocol P using subprotocols {σi} by
a 1-level tree, with P being the parent and {σi} the children. Recursively replace these children by
trees until the leaves are the basic primitives subject to analysis, and call this the associated tree of
P. (More general modular structures, represented by acyclic directed graphs, can be transformed
into trees [2].) Then the security of P can be stated in terms of that of the components in the tree:
Theorem 2. Let P be a protocol and TP its associated tree. For each vertex v in TP , let Mv be
the subprotocol corresponding to v with its own subprotocols {Ni}i=1,··· ,l. (This can be an empty set
if v is a leave.) Then, if Mv[N1I, · · · ,NlI] ǫMv -s.r.MI, we have P ǫ-s.r. PI for ǫ ≤
∑
v ǫMv .
Theorem 2 is obtained by the recursive use of Theorem 1 and the triangle inequality, replacing each
subprotocol by its ideal functionality, from the highest to the lowest level (from the leaves toward
the root). The distinguishability-advantage between P and PI is upper bounded by the sum of all
the individual distinguishability-advantages for the replacements.
It is worth mentioning that there is an alternative to Definition 1 above for the universal composable
security definition:
Definition 2: P is said to ǫ-securely realize PI (shorthand P ǫ-s.r. PI) if
∃S s.t. ∀E ‖Γ − ΓI ‖1 ≤ ǫ . (2)
In other words, the order of the quantifiers has been exchanged in this alternative. Definition 2
offers stronger security than Definition 1. The basic composition law holds for each definition –
UC-secure primitives satisfying Definition 1 give composition with like security, and similarly for
Definition 2. However, when composing protocols with mixed security definitions, the composition
generally satisfies the weaker definition.
Definition 1 is used in the Ben-Or–Mayers model. Their analysis still holds for definition 2 for
composition involving a constant number of components.
In our work, we prove UC-security for EBIT[PTP], TQA[EBIT[PTP],CI] and QA+KG according
to definition 2. Thus simple applications of these protocol will inherit the stronger security.
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3 Universal Composable Security for QA+KG
We now show the UC-security of QA+KG in the universal composability framework. As discussed
after Definition 1, we can describe the interaction between the environment E and the protocol P (or
PI+S) by a circuit of gates and channels. The distinguishability advantage is just the trace distance
between the possible final states, maximized by the environment and minimized by the simulator.
The circuit representation of the interaction is a very concise summary of the state at each stage
of the interaction. Moreover, if we replace one circuit component by another, we can capture the
difference induced on the state right after that component, and additional circuit elements cannot
increase the trace distance (by the monotonicity of the trace distance under quantum operations).
With the above in mind, our proof consists of the following steps:
(1) Show that for any environment, the interactions with QA+KG and with TQA+KG result in
the same final state, and they are therefore completely indistinguishable to the environment. In
other words, QA+KG 0-s.r. TQA+KG.
Recall that QA uses QEnc and PTC as subroutines, as well as secret keys (given by ideal key
distribution boxes KDI). In QA+KG, the encryption key is recycled if QA accepts the message.
So we may express the first protocol QA+KG as (QA+KG)[QEnc,PTC,KDI]. The second protocol
TQA+KG first creates entanglement using PTC via the insecure channel (but Bob never tells Alice
if the entanglement is accepted or rejected), next teleports the quantum message from Alice to Bob
(using an ideal classical channel which is authenticated, encrypted, and hidden) and finally outputs
the Bell measurement outcome in teleportation as a new key, if PTC accepts. Thus, TQA+KG can
be expressed as (TP+KG)[EBIT[PTC],CI].
(2) Re-write the circuit for EBIT[PTC] as a circuit for EBIT[PTP], a protocol creating ebits using a
purity test protocol, such that the two circuits are completely indistinguishable to the environment.
Therefore, EBIT[PTC] 0-s.r. EBIT[PTP].
(3) Show that EBIT[PTP] (2
√
2ǫ1/3)-s.r. EBITI using the soundness condition of EBIT[PTP]. Here,
ǫ ≤ 2−s′ is the upper bound of probability of failure in PTP.
(4) By (2) and (3), applying Theorem 1 with P=TP, σ=EBIT[PTC], it follows that TP[EBIT[PTC],CI]
(2
√
2ǫ1/3)-s.r. TP[EBITI,CI] which 0-s.r. QI, the ideal functionality of the perfectly authenticated
and encrypted quantum channel.
(5) Show that (TP+KG)[EBIT[PTC],CI] 2
√
2ǫ1/3-s.r. (TP+KG)[EBITI,CI] 0-s.r. QI+KDI, where
KDI is the ideal functionality for generating a key of a certain size between Alice and Bob.
Overall result:
Putting (1), (5), and (4) together, (QA+KG)[QEnc,PTC,KDI] 0-s.r. (TP+KG)[EBIT[PTC],CI]
2
√
2ǫ1/3-s.r. (TP+KG)[EBITI,CI] 0-s.r. QI+KDI.
So, (QA+KG)[QEnc,PTC,KDI] 2
√
2ǫ1/3-s.r. QI+KDI.
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We now prove these steps. Consider Circuit Diagram 1 below, with a schematic diagram for QA+KG
and its interaction with the environment:
R 1✐
Environment
Adversary r
r 2
✐
Circuit Diagram 1
(QA+KG)[QEnc,PTC,KDI]
M Ct Dt~σxz
t
KDi
Eq
r
Filter
~σxz
rr
V M
x, z
x, zy ytt
x, z, y, t
|ψ〉
y′
acc/rejr4
✐
r 5
✐r3
✐
Our circuit diagrams use the following conventions. (See [28] for more detail.) Time runs from left
to right. The box around the environment denotes what is accessible to it. Single and double lines
represent quantum and classical information (moving in time or space) respectively. Additional
arrows explicitly indicate the direction of information flow. Small boxes with input/output infor-
mation denote operations. Such diagrams are concise descriptions of the protocols and summarizes
how the states evolve. They will be used to present a significant part of our proofs. To help readers
gain familiarity with this representation, we go through the above diagram in detail.
We consider the most general environment allowed in the universal composability model. The
environment chooses an arbitrary state |ψ〉RM . The system M carries the quantum message to be
authenticated, and R carries all possible correlations to the quantum message. The environment
supplies the register M as input to the analyzed protocol (in particular, as input to QA), by
communicating M to Alice. See the far left of circuit diagram 1. In the security definition for
quantum authentication in Section 2.2, the system R is left unchanged and is used as a reference
for checking that the correlations to the message M are preserved. However, when considering
universal composability, the environment can share data with the adversary. Therefore, in our
analysis, the system R is given to the adversary who can use it as quantum side information when
attacking the transmission in QA. After the attack, the adversary passes all data back to the
environment (labeled 1©).
We now turn to the analyzed protocol QA+KG. We model the perfect keys used by the protocol
by including an ideal key distribution box labeled KDI, which distributes a perfect key (with 4
parts, x, z, t, y) between Alice and Bob that is not accessible to the environment. As a side remark,
note that we can model components of a protocol mathematically with perfect devices that need
not be realized physically. It simplifies further analysis when the perfect key comes from an actual
protocol; we only need to check the universal composable security of the latter [12,13] (and apply
Theorem 1).
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As described in Section 2.2, Alice encrypts the message in system M with ~σxz (the m-qubit Pauli
operator specified by the two m-bit keys x and z) and then applies the purity test code by encoding
in an error correcting code indexed by key t and injecting an error syndrome indexed by key y.
Without loss of generality, this encoding operation is a unitary transformation Ct that acts jointly on
the input logical state and the syndrome y. The encrypted and encoded state is then transmitted to
the adversary (part of the environment here), which can attack it jointly with R using any physical
process. After that, the possibly altered state is received by Bob. He first applies Dt, which reverses
Ct to return some quantum state 5© and a syndrome y′. Then y and y′ are compared in the “Eq”
operation, which outputs in register V the state acc if y = y′ and rej otherwise. Bob also decrypts
the quantum output of Dt ( 5©) with ~σxz, producing a final quantum message in system M . Finally,
the rej state will trigger the filter to replace the final quantum message and the keys x, z by error
symbols, else the systems VM will be the output for QA, and the keys x, z will be the output for
KG.
Step (1): Showing QA+KG 0-s.r. TQA+KG=(TP+KG)[EBIT[PTC],CI].
Consider Circuit Diagram 2 below, with a schematic diagram for TQA+KG and its interaction
with the environment.
R 1✐
Environment
Adversary r
r 2
✐M
❅
❅
 
 
Ct Dt
Bell
t
KDi
Eq
r
Filter
~σxz
rr
CI
V M
x, z
x, z
x, z
yty t
Circuit Diagram 2
(TP+KG)[EBIT[PTC],CI]
Φ⊗m
y, t
|ψ〉
y′
acc/rejr4
✐
r 5
✐
r6
✐
r3
✐
Circuit diagrams 1 and 2 (for the interaction between the environment and QA+KG and TQA+KG)
differ in only two places. First, encryption in QA+KG is done in TQA+KG by Alice preparing m
ebits Φ⊗m (all 2m qubits with her) and applying Bell measurements on them halves of the ebits and
the incoming message M . Having measurement outcomes x, z in TQA+KG is the same as applying
~σxz directly to the message in QA+KG. The states labeled 3© are identical in both protocols,
though prepared differently. More specifically, (x, z) arises differently, but it is completely random
in both protocols, and for a given (x, z), the postmeasurement states in 3© are identical. Second, the
measurement outcomes x, z are communicated to Bob by a hidden channel CI whose execution and
content are unknown by anyone except for Alice and Bob, and the content is transmitted exactly.
Such an unrealistic resource can be part of an ideal or partially ideal functionality against which
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we are comparing the actual protocol. Neither change will affect the final state of the environment,
and thus the two interactions are identical from the point of view of the environment.
Now, in TQA+KG, Alice’s Bell measurement can formally be delayed until after the “Eq” operation.
Thus, the dashed box in Circuit Diagram 2 with input 3© and outputs 4©, 5© is only used in
transmitting half of Φ⊗m (the other half being 6©). So, TQA+KG can be interpreted as teleportation
TP calling EBIT[PTC] in addition to the hidden channel CI which is perfectly encrypted and
authenticated classical channel as subroutines. We write TQA+KG = (TP+KG)[EBIT[PTC],CI],
to emphasize the modular structure and the potentially insecure components. Note that in this
version of EBIT[PTC], Alice does not know whether Bob accepts or rejects, since we want to make
a correspondence with the noninteractive QA.
Step (2): Re-expressing the circuit for EBIT[PTC] as a circuit for EBIT[PTP].
Consider EBIT[PTC], the components in TQA+KG that start with the state labeled by 3© 6© and
led to the state labeled by 4© 5© 6©. There is no input message, and it simply creates m ebits using
the purity test code. We extract it as the left diagram in the following (Circuit Diagram E1) for the
analysis of its UC security. We include in EBIT[PTC] the register V that holds the measurement
result acc or rej, which is known to Bob. Alice will not know if Bob accepts or rejects in our
application, but our analysis also holds for interactive protocols. The filter operation replaces 5©
by an error symbol if V is in the state rej. (For interactive protocols, 6© will also be replaced by
an error symbol.) We use A and B to denote the registers holding the final output “EPR pairs”
(systems 6© and 5© in EBIT[PTC]). The circuit components of EBIT[PTP] (in Circuit Diagram
E2) are defined similarly, except y is now a measurement outcome that is communicated from Alice
to Bob using a perfect classical channel. The subroutine EBIT[PTP] is only used in the analysis
and the requirement to send y does not play a big role, so, we omit the explicit subroutine label CI
for simplicity.
Circuit diagram E1
Environment Adversary
EBIT[PTC]
❭❭
❭
✜✜
✜
Ct Dt
KDi
Eq
r
Filter
rr
V B A
ytty
Φ⊗m
t, y
y′
acc/rejr4
✐
r 5
✐
r6
✐
r3
✐
Circuit diagram E2
Environment Adversary
EBIT[PTP]
❭❭
❭
✜✜
✜
Dt
Dt
KDi
Eq
r
Filter
rr
V B A
yt
t
Φ⊗m
t
y′
acc/rejr4
✐
r 5
✐
r 6
✐r6
✐
r3
✐
Now, the states labeled by 4© 5© 6© are the same in EBIT[PTC] (circuit diagram E1, left) and
EBIT[PTP] (circuit diagram E2, right) shown above. This was proved in Appendix E of [1] and we
provide an elementary proof in Appendix C.
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Step (3): Showing EBIT[PTP] (2
√
2ǫ1/3)-s.r. EBITI.
Circuit diagram E3
Environment Adversary
S running dummy
EBIT[PTP]
❭❭
❭
✜✜
✜
Dt
Dt r
KDi
r
Eq
r
Filter
EBITI
Φ⊗m
rr
V B A
yt
t
Φ⊗m
t
y′
acc/rejr4
✐
r 5
✐
r 6
✐r6
✐
r3
✐
We now analyze EBIT[PTP] in the UC frame-
work against the ideal protocol EBITI defined
as follows. EBITI takes an input in the state
acc or rej and outputs m perfect ebits or an
error state err accordingly. In this paper, the
state err is a tensor product of a maximally
mixed state on system A and an error symbol
on system B. (For interactive protocols, both
AB can be in error symbols.) This choice for
err will minimize the distinguishability ad-
vantage between EBIT[PTP] and EBITI.
The simulator S runs a “dummy” execution of EBIT[PTP] and takes the dummy acc or rej state
and feeds it into EBITI. Note that this S is independent of the environment. So, the quantifiers are
as given by (6) in Definition 2.
The distinguishability advantage can be upper bounded by the trace distance between the two
states held by the environment after the executions of EBIT[PTP] and S+EBITI. Let these states
be denoted by ηpt and ηI. Then we can write
ηpt = pacc ξABE ⊗ acc + prej errAB ⊗µE ⊗rej
ηI = pacc Φ
⊗m⊗ξE ⊗ acc + prej errAB ⊗µE ⊗rej (3)
where ξE = TrAB ξABE (likewise, ξAB = TrE ξABE , and similarly for η), and errAB is the tensor
product of a maximally mixed state on A and an error symbol on B, chosen so that the rej terms
are identical in ηpt and ηI. Note that pacc, prej, ξABE , and µE are determined both by the
adversarial attack and the PTP. Our choice of the simulator ensures that the reduced states on E,
conditioned on each of acc and rej, are the same for ηpt and ηI.
From (3), ‖ ηpt− ηI ‖1 = pacc ‖ ξABE − Φ⊗mAB ⊗ ξE ‖1. We upper bound this for pacc ≤ ǫ1/3 and
pacc > ǫ
1/3 separately. If pacc ≤ ǫ1/3, then, the bound is 2pacc ≤ 2ǫ1/3 since the trace distance is
at most 2. If pacc > ǫ
1/3, we seek an upper bound for ‖ ξABE − Φ⊗mAB ⊗ ξE ‖1. This is equivalent to
finding a lower bound for the fidelity F (ξABE ,Φ
⊗m
AB⊗ξE). Since the fidelity is the maximum overlap
squared between all purifications, any specific purifications of ξABE and ξE give a lower bound.
Any purification of ξABE can be expressed as
|ξ〉ABER =
√
1− α |Φ〉⊗mAB⊗|a〉ER+
∑
i
√
αi |Ψi〉AB⊗|bi〉ER (4)
where |Φ〉⊗m and {|Ψi〉}i form a basis for (C2)⊗2m, |a〉 and |bi〉 are unit vectors, and α =
∑
i αi.
Furthermore, ξER = (1 − α)|a〉〈a| +
∑
i αi|bi〉〈bi|, so, F (|a〉〈a|, ξER) = 〈a|ξER|a〉 ≥ 1 − α. Now,
F (TrR |a〉〈a|, ξE) ≥ F (|a〉〈a|, ξER) ≥ 1 − α, so, there exists a purification |a∗〉 of ξE such that
|〈a∗|a〉|2 ≥ 1 − α. Using this and (4), we obtain | (〈ξ|ABER) (|Φ⊗m〉AB⊗|a∗〉ER) |2 ≥ (1 − α)2 so,
F (ξABE ,Φ
⊗m
AB⊗ξE) ≥ (1−α)2. We now show that α ≤ ǫ2/3. To do so, note that the soundness condi-
tion of the purity test protocol in this context can be expressed as Tr
[
(TrE η
pt) ((I−Φ⊗m)⊗acc) ] ≤
ǫ. A direct substitution of (3) into the condition gives
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Tr
[
ξAB(I−Φ⊗m)
] ≤ ǫ/pacc < ǫ2/3 . (5)
We can obtain ξAB from (4) by tracing out ER in |ξ〉ABER; substituting this ξAB into (5) gives
α ≤ ǫ2/3, as claimed. Together,
‖ξABE − Φ⊗mAB⊗ξE‖1
[42]
≤ 2
√
1− F (ξABE ,Φ⊗mAB⊗ξE) ≤ 2
√
2α ≤ 2
√
2ǫ1/3
Thus, EBIT[PTP] (2
√
2ǫ1/3)-s.r. EBITI.
Step (4): By theorem 1 and the above, we conclude that TP[EBIT[PTC],CI] (2
√
2ǫ1/3)-s.r.
TP[EBITI,CI]. Note that TP[EBITI,CI] in turn can serve as our definition of the ideal functionality
QI. The ideal functionality QI uses EBITI and CI as subroutines, takes input M (the quantum
message) and has two outputs V and M . If the subroutine EBITI outputs rej, QI also outputs
rej in V and an error message in M . If EBITI outputs acc, then, QI provides an encrypted,
authenticated, and hidden channel that transmits M .
Step (5): Showing (TP+KG)[EBIT[PTC],CI] 2
√
2ǫ1/3-s.r. (TP+KG)[EBITI,CI] 0-s.r. QI+KDI.
Consider Circuit Diagram 2 again, and replace the subroutine EBIT[PTC] by EBITI+S so the
analyzed protocol becomes (TP+KG)[EBITI,CI]. By step (3), (TP+KG)[EBIT[PTC],CI] 2
√
2ǫ1/3-
s.r. (TP+KG)[EBITI,CI]. We now show that (TP+KG)[EBITI,CI] 0-s.r. QI+KDI. In QI+KDI, if
Bob outputs rej, Alice will hold a uniformly random variable in her key output system while Bob
will hold an error message in his key output system and also in M . (If Bob can send a bit to Alice,
she will replace her random variable by an error message as well.)
First, the acc event occurs with the same probabilities in both (TP+KG)[EBITI,CI] and QI+KDI,
and similarly for the rej event. When Bob outputs rej, for both protocols, we have the reduced
state in 1©, tensor product with an error message in M , a uniformly random output on Alice’s
key system, and an error message on Bob’s key system. When Bob outputs acc, M is teleported
perfectly in (TP+KG)[EBITI,CI]. Furthermore, the measurement outcome (x, z) is uncorrelated
with RM after the operation ~σx,z and uncorrelated with everything else the environment has, so it
is indistinguishable from an ideal key. Thus (TP+KG)[EBITI,CI] 0-s.r. QI+KDI.
Overall result:
Putting (1), (5), and (4) together, (QA+KG)[QEnc,PTC,KDI] 0-s.r. (TP+KG)[EBIT[PTC],CI]
2
√
2ǫ1/3-s.r. (TP+KG)[EBITI,CI] 0-s.r. QI+KDI.
So, (QA+KG)[QEnc,PTC,KDI] 2
√
2ǫ1/3-s.r. QI+KDI.
4 Discussion and open problems
Other results: See appendices D and E for proofs.
First, a variant of QA+KG called PSQA+KG is UC secure when the message is known to be pure,
such as when Alice prepares it herself. PSQA uses the approximate encryption scheme ≈QEnc in
place of QEnc, and ≈QEnc uses only half the key needed in QEnc. The proof involves a variant of
TQA+KG in which a remote state preparation (RSP) scheme is used in place of TP.
The Wegman-Carter classical authentication scheme is UC secure in the quantum composability
framework. This is important in the light of the frequent need of authenticated classical channels
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in many quantum cryptographic protocols. We provide a short informal proof, and refer to [22] for
a more complete discussion.
Discussion of our results and further open questions
Using 1 bit of back communication, and in the absence of a detected attack, the key costs of
authentication can be made negligible. We have also discussed two other methods to reduce the key
cost in Sect. 1. In terms of communication cost, both QA+KG and TQA+KG are superior to the
QKD-based methods discussed in Section 1. The main drawback of both QA+KG and TQA+KG
is that they require a large initial key. This can be circumvented at the expense of a slowly growing
round complexity, however – one can divide the m-qubit messages into
√
m groups of
√
m qubits
each and apply QA+KG to each sequentially. Besides the m qubits of quantum communication, all
other resources, including the initial key and all classical communication, will be sublinear in m.
Similarly, TQA+KG can be used instead, but an extra 2m classical bits of forward communication
is needed to gain the extra data protection.
A remaining question is the extent to which recycling can be done in QA+KG when the authen-
tication output is rej. Ref. [21], which considers encryption of classical messages, proved that at
least m−1 key-bits have to be discarded. Because of superdense coding, our intuition is that one
may need to discard roughly 2m key-bits for unknown quantum messages. Surprisingly, partial key
recycling is recently proved to be possible in [24].
At the other extreme, [21] found that the entire key, even the authentication tag, can be recycled
in their scheme (by using much more key to start with) in the case of acc. More recently, [23]
proposed quantum authentication scheme with the same feature (though their schemes also require
more key than QA), and [24] proved that the entire key can be recycled in QA. While qualitatively
interesting, this question is not of practical importance; we could easily make up for this small
extra recycled key without it by having Alice append that number of ebit-halves to the message
and keeping the other halves herself. Upon passing the authentication test, this will make up for
the consumed keys t, y and more if so desired. Meanwhile, the number of ebits is sublinear in the
message size so the resource counting is unaffected.
In fact, Bennett posed to us the question of using QA+KG as a simple means to perform QKD.
QKD can resist very high transmission noise and eavesdropping. The main challenge here is that
noise is not dealt with efficiently by PTC, which is an error detecting code rather than an error
correcting code. The solution turns out very simple and there are two equivalent ways to see it.
More generally, consider the case of quantum message authentication through uses of a noisy channel
N . This information can be given to Alice and Bob, or they can make reasonable estimates and
assumptions about the underlying channel. The adversary can further tamper with the transmission.
Alice and Bob should agree on an error correcting code. Let N ′ denote the composition of the
encoding, transmission by N , and decoding. We require N ′ to approximate (m+l)-qubit of noiseless
communication in the diamond norm. (This is the usual requirement for transmission through noisy
channel even in the absence of adversarial attack.) We keep all the steps in QA+KG, except the
(m+l)-qubit message transmission is replaced by N ′. In other words, we apply QA+KG to N ′ and
additional adversarial attack on N is transformed to an effective attack on N ′. Thus the security of
this new protocol reduces to that of QA+KG. Note that l is sublinear in m in QA, so this method
has communication rate similar to the case without an adversary, and does not require any extra
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key. In the end, regular error correction handles the regular channel noise, and QA handles the
remaining adversarial attack.
A second way to see this solution is to note that PTP can be composed with a mixed-state entan-
glement purification procotol (this solution was informally suggested to us by Anne Broadbent).
For TQA’, any composably secure ebits (with likewise secure classical channel) gives a composably
secure interactive quantum authentication scheme. There is no difference if these ebits are estab-
lished via a noisy channel and are purified, as long as the resulting ebits are tested by PTP. To
obtain a noninteractive quantum authentication scheme, the additional purification protocol has to
be equivalent to an error correcting code as described in [43], or [1], or in step (2).
In similar spirits, the entanglement testing scheme in [26] can produce composably secure ebits
using a constant amount of secure quantum communication that only depends on the desired
accuracy. This provides yet another secure authentication scheme with slightly different initial
resource requirement in the interactive setting. This new entanglement test can be further adapted
to an noninteractive by replacing the quantum communication by trusted entanglement (in turns
by using PTC with constant key size) and authentication of classical messages (again of constant
size).
Finally, when the transmitted state is known to the sender, the lower bound for the key remains
open.
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A Notation
We gather notation used frequently in the paper, roughly in order of first appearance:
– Φ: A perfect EPR pair 12(|00〉 + |11〉)(〈00| + 〈11|)
– ebit: A unit for entanglement contained in Φ
– QEnc: The particular encryption scheme that applies a random m-qubit Pauli matrix ~σxz to an
m-qubit message. This requires 2m bits of key.
– QA: The particular noninteractive scheme proposed in [1] which in turn, applies QEnc, a quan-
tum purity test code (PTC), and then a secret syndrome.
– PTC: A purity test code with error ǫ is a set of quantum codes such that given any nontrivial
Pauli error, at least a fraction 1− ǫ of the codes detect it.
– PTP: A purity test protocol with error ǫ is an LOCC scheme that, with probability less than ǫ,
outputs a quantum state tagged acc but orthogonal to m ebits.
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– TP: Teleportation
– TQA’: The interactive scheme to achieve quantum authentication using TP, in which PTP is
used to establish entanglement.
– TQA: a modification of TQA’ in which Bob never tells Alice whether the entanglement is
accepted or rejected.
– KDI: In ideal key distribution box that simply provides Alice and Bob a perfect, secret, shard
key. A variant was considered in [12] that takes an auxiliary input bit, conditioned on which
either a key or an error message will be output.
– CI: A perfect classical channel, encrypted, authenticated, and hidden.
– EBITI: The ideal functionality for generating ebits, where an input acc vs rej will control
whether the output is a number of perfect ebits or an error symbol.
– QI: Our model of a perfect quantum channel which is TP[EBITI,CI].
– QKD: Quantum key distribution
– QA+KG: QA augmented with recycling of the key used for QEnc if authentication passes. It is
treated as a pair that performs QA and key generation, while consuming a key from an ideal
KD box KDI.
– Alice and Bob: Two honest parties trying to communicate
– Eve: An active adversary
– Capitalized letters often (though not always) denote random variables and the
corresponding uncapitalized letters denote particular outcomes.
– log: Logarithm in base 2
– ρ: Generic symbol for a density matrix
– |·〉: A vector in a Hilbert space, with label “·”
|·〉〈·|: The projector onto the subspace spanned by |·〉, also known as “outer-product” of the ket
|·〉 and the bra 〈·|. We will simply write “·” in place of the bra and ket.
– |ψ〉: A unit vector or pure state. Its density matrix is given by ψ = |ψ〉〈ψ|.
– Tr(·): The trace
– TrH1(·): The partial trace over the system H1. Let ρ12 be the density matrix for a joint state on
H1 and H2. TrH1(ρ12) is the state after H1 is discarded.
– ‖ · ‖1: The Schatten 1-norm.
– F : The fidelity. For two states ρ1, ρ2 in H, F (ρ1, ρ2) = max|ψ1〉,|ψ2〉 |〈ψ1|ψ2〉|2 where |ψ1,2〉 ∈
H⊗H′ are “purifications” of ρ1,2 (i.e., TrH′ |ψ1,2〉〈ψ1,2| = ρ1,2), and 〈·|·〉 is the inner product.
Here, we can take dim(H′) = dim(H).
– σ, P, σI, PI: σ and P are generic labels for protocols, with σ possibly used as a subroutine. The
symbol of a protocol with a subscript I denotes the ideal functionality of the protocol.
• P[σ]: A protocol P calling a subroutine σ.
• P1+P2: Conjoining two protocols P1 and P2.
Note that a subroutine σ receives an input from the main protocol P and returns an output to
it. In contrast, for conjoining protocols, each may have its own input and output. The proto-
cols may be run in parallel or sequentially. In particular, information are generally exchanged
between the two, and each protocol may provide an input to the other.
• P1 = P2 if they have the same circuit (but different interpretations and/or modular struc-
tures).
– E , S: The environment and the simulator. These are sets of registers and operations and they
are sometimes personified in our discussion.
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– Γ , ΓI: The random variables describing output bits of E when interacting with P and PI + S
respectively.
– ǫ-s.r. : P ǫ-s.r. PI is a shorthand for P ǫ-securely realizes PI (see mathematical definition in
(1)). ǫ is called the distinguishability-advantage between P and PI.
– TP : The associated tree for a protocol P
B The Simplified Universal Composability (Ben-Or-Mayers) model
Our current setting is simpler than that considered in [15,2] in two ways. First, we are concerned
with unconditional security only. Second, there is no unknown corruption of any party – Alice and
Bob are honest and Eve is adversarial. We do not use the formal corruption rules.
We consider the acyclic quantum circuit model (see, for example, [44,45]), with an important
extension [2] (see also the endnotes [46]). Throughout the paper, we only consider circuits in the
extended model.
1. Structure of a protocol. A (cryptographic) protocol P can be viewed as a quantum circuit in the
extended model [2,46], consisting of inputs, outputs, a set of registers, and some partially ordered
operations.
A protocol may consist of a number of subprotocols and parties. Each subprotocol consists of
smaller units called “unit-roles,” within which the operations are considered “local.” For example,
the operations and registers of each party in each subprotocol form a unit-role. Communications
between unit-roles within a subprotocol represent internal communications; those between unit-
roles in different subprotocols represent input/output of data to the subprotocols. A channel is
modeled by an ordered pair of operations by the sender and receiver on a shared register. The
channel available for the communication determines its security features.
2. The game: security in terms of indistinguishability from the ideal functionality. Let PI denote
the ideal functionality of P. Intuitively, P is secure (in a sense defined by PI) if P and PI behave
similarly under any adversarial attack. “Similarity” between P and PI is modeled by a game between
an environment E and a simulator S. These are sets of registers and operations to be defined, and
they are sometimes personified in our discussion. In general, P and PI have very different internal
structures and are very distinguishable, and the simulator S is added to PI to make an extended
ideal protocol PI+S that is less distinguishable from P. E consists of the adversaries that act against
P and an application protocol that calls P as a subprotocol. At the beginning of the game, P or
PI+S are picked at random. E will interact with the chosen protocol (running it and attacking its
vulnerabilities), and will output a bit Γ at the end of the game. The similarity between P and
PI+S (or the lack of it) is captured in the statistical difference in the output bit Γ . See Fig. 1 for
a summary of the game.
3. Valid E. The application and adversarial strategy of E are first chosen. (These cannot depend
on whether E is interacting with P or PI+S.) E has to obey quantum mechanics, but is otherwise
unlimited in computation power. If P is chosen in the game, E can (i) control the input/output
of P, (ii) attack insecure internal communication as allowed by the channel type, (iii) direct the
adversarial parties to interact with the honest parties in P. E+P has to be an acyclic circuit in the
extended model [2,46]. Without loss of generality, an adversary can be modeled to only forward
messages between the environment and the protocol, and the actual attack is executed by the
environment. (See Lemma 12 in [47].)
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4. Valid PI and S. If PI + S is chosen in the game, E (i) controls the input/output of PI as before.
However, the interaction given by (ii) and (iii) above will now occur between E and S instead. (S
is impersonating or simulating P.) The strategy of S can depend on the strategy of E . PI should
have the same input/output structure as P, but is otherwise arbitrary. (Of course, the security
definition is only useful if PI carries the security features we want to prove for P.) In particular, PI
may be defined with internal channels and adversaries different from those of P. S can (ii′) attack
insecure internal communication of PI and (iii′) simulate the adversarial parties when interacting
with the honest parties in PI. Thus, PI exchanges information with S, and this can modified the
security features of PI. To E , S acts like part of PI, “padding” it to look like P, while to PI, S
acts like part of E . It is amusing to think of S as making a “man-in-the-middle” attack between E
and PI. Finally, E+PI+S has to be an acyclic circuit in the extended circuit model [2,46]. Let the
output bit be ΓI in this case. See Fig. 1 for a summary of the rules.
P
✲Γ
✛
✻✻
❄
E
ii,iiii i
E
PI
✲ ΓI
✻
❄
✻
❄
S
✛ ✲ii ′
iii′
ii,iii
Fig. 1. The game defining the composable security definition. The curved region in E represents
the adversaries against P, and the curved region in S represents the adversaries against PI. We
label the types of interactions as described in the text.
We now restate the universal composable security definition and give a slightly more extended
description of the fundamental composability theorems.
Definition 1: P is said to ǫ-securely realize PI (shorthand P ǫ-s.r. PI) if
∀E ∃S s.t. ‖Γ − ΓI‖1 ≤ ǫ . (6)
We call ǫ in (6) the distinguishability-advantage between P and PI. This security definition (in the
model described) is useful because security of basic composition follows “by definition” [15,2]. We
have the following simple version of a universal composability theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose a protocol P calls a subroutine σ. If σ ǫσ-s.r. σI and P[σI] ǫP-s.r. PI, then
P[σ] ǫ-s.r. PI for ǫ ≤ ǫP+ǫσ.
Theorem 1 can be generalized to any arbitrary protocol with a proper modular structure. An
example of an improper modular structure is one with a security deadlock, in which the securities
of two components are interdependent.
Proper modular structures can be characterized as follows. Let P[σ1, σ2+, · · · ] be any arbitrary
protocol using a number of subprotocols. This can be represented by a 1-level tree, with P being
the parent and {σi} the children. For each σi that uses other subprotocols, replace the corresponding
node by an appropriate 1-level subtree. This is done recursively, until the highest-level subprotocols
(the leaves) call no other subprotocols. These are the primitives. It was proved in [2] that more
general modular structures, represented by an acyclic directed graph, can be transformed to a tree.
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The following composability theorem relates the security of a protocol P to the security of all the
components in the tree.
Theorem 2. Let P be a protocol and TP its associated tree. For each vertex v in TP , let Mv be
the subprotocol corresponding to v with its own subprotocols {Ni}i=1,··· ,l. (This can be an empty set
if v is a leave.) Then, if Mv[N1I, · · · ,NlI] ǫMv -s.r.MI, we have P ǫ-s.r. PI for ǫ ≤
∑
v ǫMv .
Theorem 2 is obtained by the recursive use of Theorem 1 and the triangle inequality, replacing
each subprotocol by its ideal functionality, from the highest to the lowest level (from the leaves
toward the root). The distinguishability-advantage between P and PI is upper bounded by the sum
of all the individual distinguishability-advantages between pairs of protocols before and after each
replacement.
C The extended transpose trick
One of the most useful tricks in quantum information theory is that a transformation acting on
one half of a maximally entangled state can be implemented by applying a different transformation
acting on the other half.
We give an extended version of this trick allowing changes in the dimensions.
Let M =
∑d2
j=1
∑d1
i=1Mji|j〉〈i| be a possibly rectangular matrix, and MT =
∑d2
j=1
∑d1
i=1Mji|i〉〈j|
be its transpose.
Lemma 1: (MT ⊗ I)∑d2j=1 |j〉|j〉 = (I ⊗M)∑d1i=1 |i〉|i〉 (∈ Cd1 ⊗ Cd2).
Proof: LHS =
∑d2
j=1(M
T |j〉)|j〉 =∑d2j=1∑d1i=1Mji|i〉|j〉 =∑d1i=1 |i〉(∑d2j=1Mji|j〉) =∑d1i=1 |i〉(M |i〉)
= RHS.
Note that we are considering states differing from the maximally entangled states by a relevant
normalization.
Lemma 2: let U be a square matrix acting on systems 1 and 2 of d and d2 dimensions. Then,
(U12 ⊗ I3)
[
|y〉1
d2∑
j=1
|j〉2|j〉3
]
= (I12 ⊗ 〈y|4UT43)
dd2∑
i=1
|i〉12|i〉43 . (7)
Proof: The LHS can essentially be interpreted as the state obtained by applying U12|y〉1 to sys-
tem 2, where U12|y〉1 is the rectangular block of U12 corresponding to y (d2 contiguous columns).
Applying the first claim with U12|y〉1 → MT and d1 → dd2, the resulting state is given by
(I12 ⊗M43)
∑d1
i=1 |i〉12|i〉43 exactly as claimed.
The LHS has the interpretation that we take U12 as a real, unitary matrix that encodes the logical
state and the syndrome y into the codeword acted on by error consistent with y.
The RHS, with UT12 = U
†
12 has the interpretation as a decoding into the logical space and the
syndrome, with postselection on outcome y.
The equality in lemma 2 exactly proves the equivalence between EBIT[PTC] and EBIT[PTP].
D Security of PSQA+KG
Recall from Section 2.1 that in quantum encryption, Alice and Bob share a key K in which the
realization k occurs with probability pk. To send a message ρ, Alice transmits Ek(ρ) and Bob applies
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Dk to retrieve ρ. The approximate soundness condition is given by
∀|ψ〉MR ‖(R⊗I)(ψ)− ρ0 ⊗TrM (ψ)‖1 < δ
where ρ0 is independent of ψ and δ is a vanishing security parameter. We focus on Ek(ρ) = UkρU †k
and uniform pk.
The particular protocol QEnc has k = (x1, z1, · · · , xm, zm) and Uk = σx1z1 ⊗· · · σxmzm =: σxz, with
22m values of k, or key size 2m bits. In [29], another scheme called ≈QEnc is found (existentially)
such that only k = 134m2m/δ2 values of k are used, but the unitaries Uk are more complicated. It
has weaker security, in that ∀ρ, ‖ 1k
∑
k UkρU
†
k − I2m ‖∞ ≤ δ2m , and it satisfies the inequality of the
soundness condition only if the adversary does not have the purification of ρ (a powerful form of
quantum side information), such as when ρ is pure.
Recall from Section 2.2 that the specific protocol QA given in [1] first applies QEnc to the m-qubit
message, followed by encoding with a purity test code (choose a code Ct from a set based on a
random value of t) and then applying an operation corresponding to a random syndrome y (all
parameters as described above).
Naturally, a question arises, whether one can replace QEnc by ≈QEnc if the input for quantum
message authentication is promised to be pure. We call the resulting protocol PSQA (standing for
Pure State QA), and again, we can append key recycling as an additional step.
In this section, we prove the composable security of PSQA+KG. We believe the proof techniques
are of independent interest.
The main challenge is to model the promise that a pure state is given to Alice to be transmitted. We
handle this by imposing a restriction on the environment, and call this restricted set of environments
EX in the analysis of PSQA+KG. Fix a mapping between a set of classical labels and a set of m-
qubit pure quantum states x→ |ψx〉. The label can be real-valued and |ψx〉 unrestricted. For each
environment E ∈ EX , E can choose a value x and this results in Alice receiving an input |ψx〉 which
is unknown to her. One possible way this can happen is that a trusted party receives x and then
prepares |ψx〉 and gives it to Alice.
Recall from Section 2.3 that composable security can be proved directly if for each environment E
(which is then fixed), there exists a simulator, S, such that PSQA+KG is indistinguishable from an
appropriately chosen ideal functionality conjoining S. For each E , this simulator S for PSQA+KG
can be chosen to be the simulator for a different protocol PSQAX+KG (to be defined), against the
same environment E . In PSQAX+KG, an input x is given to Alice, who prepares |ψx〉 and then runs
PSQA+KG. Since the two protocols, PSQA+KG and PSQAX+KG, are exactly indistinguishable to
each environment E , a simulator in the analysis of latter gives the same distinguishability advantage
for the former. It therefore suffices to prove composable security for PSQAX+KG against all E ∈
EX .
The security proof for PSQAX+KG is similar to that for QA+KG, and can be done by defining a
sequence of protocols, the first being PSQAX+KG and the last an ideal protocol, such that each
protocol is similar to the next.
The first protocol is PSQAX+KG, the second is PSRQAX+KG which is the analogue of TQA+KG
in which remote state preparation (RSP) is used in place of teleportation, i.e., PSQAX+KG =
(RSP+KG)[EBIT[PTC],CI]. PSRQA
X+KG uses ebits prepared by insecure means. The third pro-
tocol is (RSP+KG)[EBITI,CI]. It has a small probability of failure δ that is not caused by any
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adversary, and provides an ideal functionality for the analysis. The analysis is identical to that for
QA+KG, except for step (1). It thus remains to show the similarity between PSQAX+KG and
PSRQAX+KG.
Recall from Section 2.1 that there is a one-to-one correspondence between ≈QEnc and RSP. In
RSP, Alice and Bob shares m ebits, and to transmit a state ρ, Alice applies a measurement M to
her half of the ebits, and sends the outcome to Bob. The POVM has the form { 1M (UkρU †k)T }k for
M = ‖∑k UkρU †k‖∞, together with an extra POVM element F = I− 1M (∑k UkρU †k)T (we say that
k = f). Conditioned on an outcome k 6= f , Bob’s half of the ebits becomes UkρU †k (this can be
proved by the transpose trick in the previous appendix), but if k = f , RSP fails. Ref. [29] shows
that taking 134m2m/δ2 different Uk’s is sufficient to ensure that Pr(f) < δ.
Once again, consider schematic diagrams, now for PSQAX+KG and PSRQAX+KG:
Environment Adversary
PSQAX+KG
x
x
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|ψx〉
y
Ct DtUk
t
KDi
Eq
r
Filter
U †k
rr
V M
kkytt
k, y, t
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In PSRQAX+KG, Alice’s measurementM is defined with ρ = ψx and this requires her knowledge of
x. This is why we focus on PSQAX+KG and use its composable security to infer that of PSQA+KG.
If k 6= f , the states label 3© in the two protocol are identical. This introduces an additional
contribution of δ to the distinguishability advantage. The rest of the analysis is identical to that of
QA+KG. An additional δ results from the difference between RSP[EBITI,CI] and QI.
Putting everything together, PSQA+KG (2
√
2ǫ1/3 + 2δ)-s.r. QI+KDI.
E Quantum universal composable security of the Wegman-Carter scheme
We consider a Wegman-Carter type of authentication scheme (WC) that does the following. Let
H = {hk}k be an ǫ-almost-strongly universal2 family of hash functions from the set of messages
M to the set of authentication tags T . Let k, t be the value of the shared key. If the message is
x, Alice transmits (x, hk(x) ⊕ t) to Bob, where ⊕ represents the bitwise xor. In other words, the
hash value of the message is one-time-padded with the key t. Usually, when executing this scheme
WC, the same hash function is reused for subsequent messages.
Here, we analyze WC+KG, which runs WC and recycles the key k, in a way similar to but much
simpler than QA+KG. In particular, we let k, t be the output from an internal KDI box that
provides the keys to WC. Note that recycling of the key k is more general than reusing of the hash
function (universal vs non-universal composability).
The ideal functionality has two parts. The first part is a magic authentication box that sends the
message x via an insecure channel, and the received message is x′. The output is (x, acc) if x = x′,
and (rej) if x 6= x′. The second part is KDI which outputs a perfect key k between Alice and Bob.
The simulator runs the ideal authentication box to transmit x to the environment, but appends
a random tag h, and receives x′, h′. The simulator checks if h = h′ and feeds x′ into the ideal
authentication box, which then outputs (x,acc) or (rej). If t = t′ and the output is (x,acc), the
simulator makes the final output (x,t,acc,k), else, the simulator outputs (rej,k).
WC+KG and the ideal functionality differ only if (x, h) 6= (x′, h′) and the former accepts. This
happens with probability less than ǫ, which then upper bounds the distinguishability advantage.
Due to [22], we are now aware of a problem that in principle, an adversary can guess a key value
and tamper with the message accordingly, and the subsequent acc or rej output leaks information
on the key to be recycled. This introduces an additional contribution to the distinguishability
advantage. We leave the work of correcting the above proof for a later version of this manuscript.
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